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Colleges and universities throughout the world rely on different 
funding models to cover costs. Regardless of the model used, these 
institutions are experiencing intense pressure to control costs. 
However, controlling indirect costs in traditional not-for-profit 
institutions of higher learning is in direct conflict with a more 
powerful survival motive. We propose that actions required to attract 
and retain students lead to product proliferation in the form of 
increased programmatic offerings and to other forms of student 
support, which leads to higher costs. Cost containment is not a 
realistic priority given the prevailing institutional structures. 
 
Keywords: Higher education funding models, indirect cost control, 
program proliferation, cross-subsidization, product mix. 
 
 
Les établissements d’enseignement supérieur et les universités se 
basent sur des modèles de financement différents pour couvrir leurs 
coûts. Indépendamment du modèle utilisé, ces institutions subissent 
une forte pression en matière de maîtrise des coûts. Cependant, le 
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contrôle des coûts indirects dans des institutions traditionnelles à but 
non lucratif d’enseignement supérieur est directement en conflit avec 
un moteur de survie encore plus puissant. Nous suggérons que les 
actions requises pour attirer et conserver les étudiants entraînent une 
prolifération des produits sous la forme d’une augmentation des offres 
de programmes et d’autres formes de soutien offertes aux étudiants, 
qui entraînent à leur tour une augmentation des coûts. La 
compression des coûts n’est pas une priorité réaliste étant donné les 
structures institutionnelles prédominantes. 
 
Mots-clés : Modèles de financement des établissements d’enseigne-
ment supérieur, contrôle des coûts indirects, prolifération des 
programmes, subventions croisées, gamme de produits. 
 
 
Las escuelas superiores y las universidades se apoyan en modelos 
de financiación diferentes para cubrir sus costos. Independientemente 
del modelo utilizado, dichas instituciones sufren una fuerte presión en 
el ámbito del control de costos. Sin embargo, el control de costos 
indirectos en las instituciones tradicionales sin fines lucrativos de 
educación superior está en conflicto directo con un motor de 
supervivencia aún más poderoso. El artículo sugiere que las acciones 
requeridas para atraer y conservara los estudiantes acarrean una 
proliferación de productos que se traduce por un aumento de ofertas 
de programas y de otras formas de apoyo propuestas al estudiante, 
provocando así un incremento de los costos. La compresión de costos 
no es una prioridad realista dadas las estructuras institucionales 
predominantes. 
 
Palabras claves: Modelos de financiación, control de costos 







The Motive for Indirect Cost Control in Higher Education 
 
Colleges and universities throughout the world rely on different 
funding models to cover their costs. These models range from 
predominantly tuition-based funding to total state support. Regardless 
of the funding model, these institutions find themselves facing intense 
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pressure to control costs in the wake of “a massive change in ideas 
about who should pay, and about the nature of a university education” 
(Altbach, 1997, p.16).1 The budget pressure has been addressed in 
various ways such as initiating a tuition charge and altering the 
funding process in the United Kingdom (Johnes, 1997) and increasing 
prices in the United States, where higher-education tuition has 
outpaced inflation for more than a quarter of a century (Baum et al., 
2007). 
The most recent statistics reported by the College Board (Baum et 
al., 2007) confirm that the trend is continuing (see Table 1). The 
seemingly unfettered increase in tuition became of such major public 
concern in the 1990s that, in 1997, Congress created the National 
Commission on the Cost of Higher Education to investigate the 
sources of the phenomenon (Public Law 105-18). There has since 
been considerable analysis of the relationship between the costs of 
not-for-profit higher education and the prices charged, including an 
investigation of the cost disparities among the different program 
offerings, with the strong suggestion that institutions need to do more 
to understand and control their costs (Stringer and Cunningham, 1999 
and Baum et al., 2007). Yet, there has been little rigorous discussion 
of the underlying forces that would motivate such a strengthening of 
cost controls.   
The premise presented in this paper is that the notion of controlling 
indirect costs in traditional institutions of higher learning is in direct 
conflict with the more powerful motive of survival. We propose that 
the actions required to attract and retain students which is a necessity 
for survival lead ultimately to product proliferation in the form of 
increased programmatic offerings and to other forms of increased 
student support, which in turn leads to higher costs. We argue that cost 
containment in the not-for-profit sector is simply not a realistic 
priority. 
  
                                                                        
1. For example, in the College Board’s most recent survey of trends in college pricing, 
Baum et al. (2007, p. 4) remarked that “if college education is to become more 
affordable for more students, institutions will have to find ways to offer high-quality 
higher education in a more cost-effective manner, and state and federal governments 
will have to improve their systems for supporting both postsecondary institutions and 
the students they educate”.  
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Questioning Costs The National Commission on the Cost of 
Higher Education 
 
In June 1997, Congress passed the Cost of Higher Education 
Review Act as part of Public Law 105-18 in direct response to at least 
two different factors (§40001). The first was a General Accounting 
Office (GAO) report indicating that tuition at the nation’s public 4-
year institutions had risen more than three times as fast as the 
Consumer Price Index over the period from 1980-1981 to 1994-1995. 
The second was overwhelming evidence of mounting public concern 
over the affordability of higher education. The Act established the 
National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education (the 
Commission or NCCHE) and mandated 11 specific areas to be 
addressed in a final report to the President and the Congress (§40002 
and 40004). The mandates directed the Commission to study and 
make recommendations regarding trends in tuition, costs, and 
financial aid, as well as the extent to which regulatory requirements 
and fiscal policies might have contributed to the observed trends. 
In its final report, the Commission expressed grave concern over 
the trends in rising prices (tuition) and in rising costs. Its observation 
that “most institutions of higher education have permitted a veil of 
obscurity to settle over their financial operations and many have yet to 
take seriously basic strategies for reducing costs” (NCCHE, 1998, p. 
ix) is predictive of the agenda that was to be offered an agenda in 
which the first item was a need to “strengthen institutional cost 
control” (p. xiv) and to be held more accountable for both prices and 
costs. The ominous alternative, according to the Commission, is 
governmentally-imposed “unilateral solutions that are likely to be 
heavy-handed and regulatory” (p. xiv). 
Since the Congressional mandate implied a strong relationship 
between costs and prices, the NCCHE set out to better understand 
cost behavior in not-for-profit higher education. It focused on six 
potential drivers financial aid, people, facilities, technology, 
regulations, and expectations. While the Commission concluded that 
Federal grant availability had not contributed to rising prices, it did 
note an increase in the level of institutional aid being offered and 
suggested a possible correlation with increased tuitions, since 
institutional aid is principally funded by tuition revenue.  
In its consideration of people as a driver of costs (and 
correspondingly, prices), the Commission looked to three groups 
students, administrators, and faculty. With respect to students, the 
NCCHE cited (1) the increasing numbers of nontraditional students, 
HIGHER EDUCATION: INDIRECT COST CONTROL  67 
(2) students requiring remedial courses, and (3) students with 
disabilities and concluded that all three categories would likely place 
increased demands on institutional resources. The Commission 
acknowledged that these changes in the student population might 
logically lead to a need for larger numbers of administrators (and 
hence greater costs), yet the numbers did not support such a 
conclusion for the more recent portion of the time period studied. 
Indeed, from 1987-1994, there had been no increase in the proportion 
of administrative expenditures relative to total educational and 
general expenditures; in some years, there was actually a decrease in 
the percentage. The same was found true when the Commission 
examined faculty hiring and workload practices as possible 
contributors to rising institutional costs. 
Facilities- and technology-related expenditures, as well as 
regulatory compliance, were also found to be potential sources of 
rising costs. Increased enrollments since the late 1960s forced new 
construction just to accommodate the students. Also, the rising 
number of students with disabilities forced retrofitting of existing 
facilities. Though technology might promise long-run economies, the 
Commission did not find evidence that cost savings had yet been 
realized. Rather, the Commission found that the costs of acquiring 
equipment and creating the supporting infrastructure had been 
substantial and was a likely contributor to increased costs. The 
Commission also observed that a growing body of Federal regulations 
and the requirements of an ever-expanding roster of accrediting 
bodies, were proving to do little more than “increase red tape and 
drive up costs” (p. 20). 
Last and perhaps most interesting to the arguments set forth in this 
paper, the Commission posited expanding expectations on the part of 
students, parents, faculty, and administrators as a driver of costs. The 
expanding expectations noted by the Commission include, for 
example: from students a wide array of course offerings at convenient 
times, well-equipped and modern facilities, dedicated personal and 
career counseling, and on-campus child-care; from faculty 
increasingly specialized curricula in existing and brand new 
disciplines, limited classroom preparations and limited exposure to 
lower division courses, and research support. And, as the Commission 
recognized, satisfying these expectations translates into higher costs 
for the institution. 
After describing its assessment of the key drivers of costs in 
higher education, the Commission came to a sobering realization 
concerning institutions’ desire to understand the underlying causes of 
costs:  
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The truth is that institutions prefer not to look too 
hard at these matters, both because a broad-based 
curriculum is a desirable thing in and of itself and 
because of a desire to base decisions on quality 
and not on costs. This Commission, therefore, 
finds itself in the discomfiting position of 
acknowledging that the nation’s academic 
institutions, justly renowned for their ability to 
analyze practically every other major economic 
activity in the United States, have not devoted 
similar analytic attention to their own internal 
financial structures. Blessed, until recently, with 
sufficient resources that allowed questions about 
costs or internal cross-subsidies to be avoided, 
academic institutions now find themselves 
confronting hard questions about whether their 
spending patterns match their priorities (p. 12). 
 
Thus, as the first of its five major recommendations, the 
Commission suggested that academic institutions must do a better job 
at controlling their costs, proclaiming that “the effort . .  . should 
challenge the basic assumptions governing how institutions think 
about quality [and would] require a greater willingness to focus 
institutional resources on a few priority areas where excellence can be 
sustained” (p. 15). 
 
 
The Reaction: Amendments to the Higher Education Act 
 
Shortly after receiving the NCCHE report, Congress passed the 
Higher Education Amendments of 1998, which directed the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) to conduct a nation-wide 
study of institutions’ expenditures for faculty, administration, 
academic support, research, maintenance, and facilities (including 
technology) and to examine the relationship between institutional 
expenditures and prices charged (Public Law 105-22, §131). The 
NCES commissioned several studies as part of its research and 
published the two-volume Study of College Costs and Prices, 1988-89 
to 1997-98 in late 2001 and A Study of Higher Educational 
Expenditures: The Delaware Study of Instructional Costs and 
Productivity in mid-2003. 
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Findings Reported by the NCES 
 
The findings reported in Volume 1of the Study of College Costs 
and Prices (NCES, 2001) were consistent with those of the NCCHE 
and with the earlier GAO report that had prompted the formation of 
the Commission i.e., any relationship between costs and prices in the 
higher education sector is a weak one. Across all types of public 
institutions, the single variable with the greatest power to explain the 
phenomenon of rising prices was “change in revenue from 
government appropriations.” For private institutions, there was no 
single variable that could explain the changes in tuition; however, as 
was true for public universities, institutional aid had increased more 
rapidly than most other expenditure categories and was positively 
correlated with tuition increases. 
A Study of Higher Educational Expenditures: The Delaware Study 
of Instructional Costs and Productivity (NCES, 2003) focused 
exclusively on instructional-related expenditures, as that category was 
found to be the largest expenditure category for all institutions in all 
sectors. The data were drawn from the Delaware Study of 
Instructional Costs and Productivity (the Delaware Study), which 
began as an institutional effort at the University of Delaware and grew 
into a voluntary data-sharing consortium of over 300, 4-year 
institutions. The characteristics of the participating institutions limit 
the generalizability of the findings, in that they tend to be larger, more 
complex organizations. Further, the Delaware Study focuses only on 
direct instructional costs, so the data cannot explain the behavior of 
institutions’ full costs. Despite these limitations, the NCES argued 
that the findings are useful because they provide insight into the 
drivers of the largest single expenditure in most institutions’ operating 
budgets. 
The design of the Delaware Study was grounded in the recognition 
that a key component of instructional expense is personnel-related and 
that observed salaries are more clearly related to the academic 
discipline than to any other factor. The NCES looked at three cycles 
of the data from the Delaware Study to determine the degree to which 
direct instructional costs varied across disciplines within institutions 
and within disciplines across different institutional types (which was 
assumed to serve as a surrogate for institutional mission). The NCES 
study also sought to assess whether levels of highest degree offered 
and relative emphasis on graduate versus undergraduate education 
affected instructional costs within any given discipline and to identify 
other factors that might explain costs within a discipline (such as the 
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relative dependence on tenured versus non-tenured faculty and the 
relative teaching load). 
After analyzing data from the Delaware Study, the NCES 
concluded that there are notable cost differentials across disciplines 
and that those differentials are more significant within institutions 
than across institutions in other words, certain disciplines (particularly 
those offered by so-called service departments like math and English) 
are less costly whether offered at a research/doctoral institution or at a 
baccalaureate institution for the simple reason that the courses taught 
in these departments “are in high demand and tend to be major 
student credit hour producers, [which is] one of the primary factors 
associated with reducing instructional expenditures” (p. 25). For 
example, the direct instructional expense in English ranged from $112 
per credit hour at comprehensive institutions to $140 per credit hour 
at research institutions a difference of $28 across institutional type. 
For mechanical engineering the range was from $316 at doctoral 
institutions to $379 at research universities a difference of $63 across 
institutional type. In contrast, the range between English and 
mechanical engineering within the category of research universities 
was from $140 for English to $379 for mechanical engineering a 
difference of $239. For comprehensive universities, the range was 
from $112 for English to $342 for mechanical engineering a 
difference of $230 (NCES, 2003). The NCES also observed that 
graduate education and decreased faculty workloads were, as 
anticipated, both associated with higher instructional expenses, but 
these factors were not nearly as important to overall instructional 
costs as was the mix of programs: 
 
Simply put, it is possible to examine two 
research universities, one with a heavy 
curricular emphasis on physical sciences and 
engineering, the other with emphasis on the 
social sciences and humanities, and find 
substantial differences between overall 
instructional costs at the two institutions owing 
to the disciplinary mix at each. Similarly, it is 
possible to examine a research university and a 
baccalaureate college, each focused on the 
social sciences and humanities, and find no 
difference in overall unit instructional costs, 
again owing to disciplinary mix (p. 26-27). 
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Product Mix and Cross-Subsidization in the Public Sector 
 
The NCES’ conclusion that the disciplinary product mix is a key 
determinant of an institution’s overall instructional expenditures, 
coupled with the finding of wide cost disparities among the various 
disciplinary programs, confirms that product cost cross-subsidization 
is a reality in not-for-profit higher education.2 That some programs 
are more cost-effective than others comes as no surprise; however, 
Massey (1997, p. 87) goes so far as to assert that “cross subsidies 
represent the ascendancy of institutional values over market forces”, 
arguing that “they are a necessary and desirable attribute of not-for-
profit organizations”. 
Thus, it seems obvious and acceptable that an institution of higher 
learning would, in the interest of the greater good, accept certain 
product cross-subsidies as a necessity (Lewis and Pendlebury, 2002). 
What remains unclear is the degree to which an institution’s product 
mix is related to the overall level of non-instructional-related 
institutional expenditures, i.e., indirect support costs. The NCCHE 
hinted at a relationship when it identified “expectations” as a primary 
cost driver; yet, in our view, there is little motivation for public 
college and university officials to consider this possibility when 
making product mix decisions. 
In the United States, any planned new program offerings (by any 
type of institution, public or private not-for-profit or for-profit) must 
be approved by the affected state’s Commission on Higher Education 
(CHE). Public institutions face greater scrutiny in the process than 
private institutions because they receive substantial funds from the 
state. Therefore, they must address the anticipated demand for the 
program, the extent to which the proposed program might duplicate 
programs offered by other state-funded institutions serving essentially 
the same student population, and the anticipated incremental direct 
costs of the program (including library resources), as well as the 
extent to which the proposed program would require additional capital 
                                                                        
2. Higher education is unique in that it charges the same price (i.e., tuition) for its entire 
array of similar products. While some institutions charge special fees for certain courses 
and/or programs, the stated tuition rate is not dependent upon the program of study. The 
product being sold is not any particular degree program, but rather the right to pursue a 
degree. In other words, “a four-year college degree is analogous to the all-day ticket at 
Disney World: a student pays a price that entitles him or her to partake of the entire 
academic experience. The rides he or she takes . . . are up to the student” (Stringer and 
Cunningham., 1999, p. 25). 
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expenditures.3 A program that will draw new students to an institution 
without negatively impacting the enrollments at a sister institution and 
that can be provided without adding significant direct costs is, ceteris 
paribus, more likely to be approved. Thus, the most important 
consideration, in our opinion, is whether the new program will draw 
students in sufficient numbers, such that added sources of funds will 
more than offset any anticipated incremental direct costs. 
Most universities have no existing infrastructure that allows them 
to estimate the incremental demands placed on support activities 
(including, but not limited to, admissions, registration, advising, 
library processes, financial aid, facilities maintenance, transportation, 
security, computing services, student services, and development) by 
new program offerings.4 One argument for ignoring these demands 
might be that it is the increased numbers of students and/or mission-
related decisions (e.g., graduate versus undergraduate education or 
research versus teaching emphasis) and not the new program itself 
that places demands on an institution’s support activities. This view 
holds that costs are more a function of enrollments given the 
institutional mission than of the choice of the disciplinary mix (again, 
given the mission). If that were the case, any attempt at indirect cost 
allocation would be an exercise in futility and would provide little, if 
any, meaningful insight (Breneman, 2001).  
A far more powerful argument, in our opinion, is that university 
officials in the public sector quite simply do not want to know the 
impact of product proliferation on indirect support costs because to 
know the impact might imply that the institution should become 
smaller rather than larger. Since “smaller” implies lower funding 
needs, the notion that public university officials would actively pursue 
a strategy that could lead to contraction and correspondingly lower 
levels of state support seems both irrational and counterintuitive. We 
believe our theory of self-preservation provides a more plausible 
explanation for the so-called financial “veil of obscurity” (NCCHE, 
1998, p. ix) that prevents any serious consideration of cost 
containment and/or reduction at most institutions.  We believe that the 
motive is not so much to offer a “broad-based curriculum” or to 
pursue “quality programs” (NCCHE, 1998, p. 12); it is more about the 
basic instinct to survive, prosper, and grow. 
                                                                        
3. Each state’s requirements for new program proposals are outlined on the website for 
that particular state’s CHE. 
4. Together, most of these costs comprise what has come to be known as the 
administrative lattice, that network of non-instructional administrative costs that has 
grown even as faculties have decreased (Zemsky and Massy, 1990). 
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The Self-Preservation Motive Against Understanding 
Indirect Cost Behavior 
 
As discussed earlier, the NCCHE (1998) identified financial aid, 
people, facilities, technology, regulations, and expectations as primary 
cost drivers in higher education. In its discussion of expectations, the 
Commission made note of an increasing demand from both students 
and faculty for a wider array of increasingly specialized program 
offerings. If the Commission’s conclusions were correct, then today’s 
institutions have little choice but to offer more options to potential 
students in order to remain competitive and guarantee their continued 
existence. Without students, there is no institution, and the more 
students there are, the stronger the institution’s case for increased 
funding. 
Program proliferation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy in this 
environment. Enhanced program offerings become the means to the 
end. Cost is of relatively little concern, especially if one accepts 
Bowen’s (1980) “revenue theory of costs”, which states that 
traditional (i.e., not-for-profit) institutions raise all the money they 
can and spend whatever money they raise. The theory holds that costs 
are a function of revenues, rather than the other way around (Jones, 
2001).5 The objective is therefore to enhance the inflow of funds. 
Managers are motivated to maximize revenues. If a better 
understanding of indirect cost behavior could in any way limit 
funding of new or existing programs, then managers would be better 
off without such knowledge. 
Winston (2001, p.118, and 1998) takes Jones’ argument that an 
understanding of cost behavior cannot possibly explain the 
phenomenon of rising tuitions one step further by describing not-for-
profit higher education as “part charity and part commerce-churches 
and car dealers” in his attempt to explain the economics of higher 
education. Post-secondary institutions are commercial enterprises 
because they “sell” a product; they are charities because the prices 
charged never cover the full costs. In essence, all products’ costs are 
subsidized-those of the most costly programs as well as those of the 
                                                                        
5. In his paper, Jones (2001) explains why he believes Congress’ assumption that rising 
tuition is attributable to increased costs is an ill-founded one. He suggests that tuition is 
a function of non-tuition revenues and market factors. As state appropriations and other 
alternative sources of revenue fall, tuitions rise; it’s as simple as that. He states: “It is 
only in the most tuition-dependent private institutions that prices and cost behaviors are 
closely linked. Even in this instance, however, it is important to recognize the direction 
of causality the cost patterns emerge after the revenue constraints are established” (p. 
49). 
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least costly programs. The argument is that, even with tuitions and 
costs both outpacing inflation, students are purchasing the product at a 
bargain price.  
The difference between the net tuition prices and the average costs 
is the amount of the subsidy offered to all students, a subsidy that 
must be funded by non-tuition sources of revenue. Tuitions in the 
public sector have risen, these experts conclude, not because of out-
of-control costs, but rather because of a trend toward decreased state 
appropriations to support higher education. Their arguments are 
substantiated by the empirical findings of the NCES (2001 and 2003), 
which send no signal of an urgent need for enhanced cost control at 
the nation’s post-secondary not-for-profit institutions. The problem, if 
these arguments are valid, is not one related to costs; it is related 
instead to the source of the subsidy. 
 
 
The Flaw in the Argument 
 
The arguments are accepted in the literature and seem sound, 
except that, in our view, there is a huge variable being overlooked that 
the traditional higher education community would prefer to ignore. 
That variable is the for-profit post-secondary institution. If prices in 
the not-for-profit sector are competitive and if they are, as Winston 
(2001 and 1998) suggests, always insufficient to cover costs, then 
how is it that an entire sector of the industry can compete profitably in 
the same market?  
The for-profit sector now enrolls about 7 percent of the 
undergraduate population in the U.S. (Baum et al., 2007). Published 
prices have been increasing in this sector just as they have in the not-
for-profit sector, but, as Table 1 shows, the most recently reported 
increase is, at 6.2 percent, less than the increase at the nation’s 4-year 
private not-for-profit institutions and also less than the increase at 
public 4-year institutions. Further, the average tuition charged in the 
for-profit sector is, at $12,089, considerably less than the $16,640 
average tuition that public 4-year institutions charge for out-of-state 
tuition and the $23,712 average tuition charged by private not-for-
profit 4-year institutions (Baum et al., 2007).6 How can they do it? 
                                                                        
6. An element of caution is necessary in interpreting these dollar amounts because they 
represent published tuition rates. An important characteristic of not-for-profit education 
is that the published prices do not necessarily represent what students actually pay. 
Tuition discounting must be considered before valid comparisons about relative prices 
can be made. Still, the comparative sticker prices provide no evidence that the for-profit 
sector is profitable because it charges higher prices.  
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An obvious, but overly simplistic, explanation is that the typical 
proprietary institution is substantially different in its product offerings 
and market positioning than traditional institutions that it is a far 
“simpler” institution, that the lack of complexity explains the ability 
to make a profit. While that may well have been true in the early years 
of this sector’s entry into the marketplace, it is not uniformly the case 
anymore. Institutions that started out offering just a few focused 
programs have branched out to many more areas, including graduate 
and advanced professional education. Institutions that once had very 
few full-time faculty members have added considerably to their full-
time ranks. Institutions that had very little investment in physical 
facilities have spent large sums to establish on-ground campuses with 
state-of-the art classrooms. Institutions that once tapped only the 
nontraditional college population have begun recruiting the traditional 
entry-level student just completing high school.  
We propose that officials at for-profit institutions are, like their 
counterparts at not-for-profit institutions, motivated toward product 
proliferation and that such proliferation is likely to cause an increase 
in indirect costs. However, the profit motive forces a different 
mentality altogether, a mentality that is in stark contrast to that 
prevailing in the more traditional public and private not-for-profit 
sector of higher education. The for-profit mentality emphasizes 
efficiency to a greater degree than that found in not-for-profit 
institutions (Winston, 1999). In for-profit institutions, survival is not 
tied to growth measured through enrollments. It is tied to growth 
measured through profits. Program proliferation in the for-profit 
sector can only happen to the extent that cost-efficiencies can be 
achieved. The demand for efficiency and effectiveness combined (as 
opposed to effectiveness alone) permits the for-profit sector to engage 
in product proliferation without negatively impacting the bottom line. 
Unless and until existing funding structures force the public and 
private not-for-profit sector to achieve demonstrated cost-efficiency, 
we believe that tuitions and costs will continue to outpace inflation. 
To expect otherwise would demand that higher education officials in 
this sector redefine what they believe is necessary for survival. 
Changing the funding models is a complex and, at public institutions, 
highly controversial and politicized issue, however7. Any change in 
                                                                        
7. There is some evidence that a funding model in which unused dollars do not revert 
back to the state can motivate cost containment efforts. Such is the case at the 
University of Michigan. Zemsky and Massy (1990, p. 20) argue that one of the primary 
reasons that institution could seriously embark upon a cost containment campaign was 
that it “enjoys considerable constitutional and financial autonomy” that is unique among 
public institutions. 
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the process is likely to come about only gradually and only as a result 










ALTBACH, P., « Let the Buyer Pay: International Trends in Funding for Higher 
Education », International Higher Education, n°9, Fall, 1997, p. 16-17.  
BAUM S., BRODIGAN D., and MA, J., Trends in College Pricing 2007, College 
Board, New York, 2007. 
BOWEN H., The Costs of Higher Education: How Much Do Colleges and 
Universities Spend per Student and How Much Should They Spend? 
Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1980. 
BRENEMAN D., « An Essay on College Costs », National Center for Education 
Statistics, Study of College Costs and Prices, 1988-89 to 1997-98, Volume 
2: Commissioned Papers, Washington, U.S. Department of Education, 
Washington, 2001, p.13-20. 
JOHNES G., Costs in UK Higher Education: A System-Wide Perspective, 
Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Edinburgh, March, 
1997. 
JONES D., « Cost Analysis and the Formulation of Public Policy », National 
Center for Education Statistics, Study of College Costs and Prices, 1988-
89 to 1997-98, Volume 2: Commissioned Papers, U.S. Department of 
Education, Washington, 2001, p. 45-55. 
LEWIS B. and PENDLEBURY M., « Surplus or Deficit—Who Cares? Cross-
Subsidy in Colleges of Higher Education », Financial Accountability and 
Management, vol. 18, n°1, February, 2002, p. 25-38. 
MASSY W., « Remarks on Restructuring Higher Education », National 
Commission on the Cost of Higher Education, Straight Talk About 
College Costs and Prices, Oryx Press, Phoenix, 1998, p. 84-91. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE COST OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Straight Talk 
About College Costs and Prices, Oryx Press, Phoenix, 1998.  
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, Study of College Costs and 
Prices, 1988-89 to 1997-98, Volume 2: Commissioned Papers, U.S. 
Department of Education, Washington, 2001. 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, A Study of Higher Education 
Instructional Expenditures: The Delaware Study of Instructional Costs 
and Productivity, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, 2003. 
PUBLIC LAW 105-18, Cost of Higher Education Review Act of 1997, §40001 et 
seq. 
PUBLIC LAW 105-22, Higher Education Amendments of 1998, §131. 
HIGHER EDUCATION: INDIRECT COST CONTROL  77 
STRINGER W. and CUNNINGHAM A., Costs, Price, and Public Policy: Peering 
into the Higher Education Black Box. New Agenda Series, USA Group 
Foundation, Indianapolis, vol. 1, n°3, 1999. 
WINSTON G., « College Costs: Subsidies, Intuition, and Policy », National 
Commission on the Cost of Higher Education, Straight Talk About 
College Costs and Prices, Oryx Press, Phoenix, 1998, p. 117-127. 
WINSTON G., « For-Profit Higher Education », Change, Vol. 31, n° 1, 
January/February 1999, p. 12-19. 
WINSTON G., « Higher Education’s Costs, Prices, and Subsidies: Some 
Economic Facts and Fundamentals », National Center for Education 
Statistics, Study of College Costs and Prices, 1988-89 to 1997-98, Volume 
2: Commissioned Papers, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, 
2001, p. 117-128. 
ZEMSKY R. and MASSY W., « Cost Containment: Committing to a New 
Economic Reality », Change, vol. 22, n°6, November/December, 1990, p. 
16-22. 
 
78  Kenneth J. EUSKE & Kay.M. POSTON 
Table 1 
 




Type of Institution 
Average Published 
Tuition and Fees 
for 2007-2008 
Percentage Increase 
from Prior Year 
Public 2-year 

















Source: Baum et al. (2007, p.6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

